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Abstract
We study adversarial perturbations when the instances are uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n. We
study both “inherent” bounds that apply to any problem and any classifier for such a problem as well as
bounds that apply to specific problems and specific hypothesis classes.
As the current literature contains multiple definitions of adversarial risk and robustness, we start by
giving a taxonomy for these definitions based on their direct goals; we identify one of them as the one
guaranteeing misclassification by pushing the instances to the error region. We then study some classic
algorithms for learning monotone conjunctions and compare their adversarial risk and robustness under
different definitions by attacking the hypotheses using instances drawn from the uniform distribution.
We observe that sometimes these definitions lead to significantly different bounds. Thus, this study
advocates for the use of the error-region definition, even though other definitions, in other contexts with
context-dependent assumptions, may coincide with the error-region definition.
Using the error-region definition of adversarial perturbations, we then study inherent bounds on risk
and robustness of any classifier for any classification problem whose instances are uniformly distributed
over {0, 1}n. Using the isoperimetric inequality for the Boolean hypercube, we show that for initial
error 0.01, there always exists an adversarial perturbation that changes O(
√
n) bits of the instances to
increase the risk to 0.5, making classifier’s decisions meaningless. Furthermore, by also using the central
limit theorem we show that when n → ∞, at most c · √n bits of perturbations, for a universal constant
c < 1.17, suffice for increasing the risk to 0.5, and the same c · √n bits of perturbations on average
suffice to increase the risk to 1, hence bounding the robustness by c · √n.
*This is the full version of a work with same title that will appear in NIPS 2018.
†Authors have contributed equally.
‡Supported by NSF CAREER award CCF-1350939 and University of Virginia SEAS Research Innovation Award.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, modern machine learning tools (e.g., neural networks) have pushed to new heights the
classification results on traditional datasets that are used as testbeds for various machine learning methods.1
As a result, the properties of these methods have been put into further scrutiny. In particular, studying the
robustness of the trained models in various adversarial contexts has gained special attention, leading to the
active area of adversarial machine learning.
Within adversarial machine learning, one particular direction of research that has gained attention in
recent years deals with the study of the so-called adversarial perturbations of the test instances. This line
of work was particularly popularized, in part, by the work of Szegedy et al. [SZS+14] within the context of
deep learning classifiers, but the same problem can be asked for general classifiers as well. Briefly, when
one is given a particular instance x for classification, an adversarial perturbation x′ for that instance is a new
instance with minimal changes in the features of x so that the resulting perturbed instance x′ is misclassified
by the classifier h. The perturbed instance x′ is commonly referred to as an adversarial example (for the
classifier h). Adversarial machine learning has its roots at least as back as in [LM05, NRH+10]. However,
the work of [SZS+14] revealed pairs of images that differed slightly so that a human eye could not identify
any real differences between the two, and yet, contrary to what one would naturally expect, machine learning
classifiers would predict different labels for the classifications of such pairs of instances. It is perhaps this
striking resemblance to the human eye of the pairs of images that were provided in [SZS+14] that really
gave this new push for intense investigations within the context of adversarial perturbations. Thus, a very
intense line of work started, aiming to understand and explain the properties of machine learning classifiers
1For example, http://rodrigob.github.io/are_we_there_yet/build/ has a summary of state-of-the-art results.
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on such adversarial perturbations; e.g., [GSS15, MFF16, BIL+16, CW17b, MMS+18]. These attacks are
also referred to as evasion attacks [NRH+12, BFR14, GSS15, CW17b, XEQ18]. There is also work that
aims at making the classifiers more robust under such attacks [PMW+16, XEQ18], yet newer attacks of
Carlini and Wagner [CW17a] broke many proposed defenses.
Our general goal. In this work, we study barriers against robust classification of adversarial examples.
We are particularly interested in foundational bounds that potentially apply to broad class of problems and
distributions. One can study this question from the perspectives of both risk and robustness. In the case
of risk, the adversary’s goal is to increase the error probability of the classifier (e.g., to reach risk 0.5) by
small perturbations of the instances, and in the case of robustness, we are interested in the average amount
of perturbations needed for making the classifier always fail.
Studying the uniform distribution. We particularly study adversarial risk and robustness for learning
problems where the input distribution is Un which is uniform over the hypercube {0, 1}n. We measure
the cost of perturbations using the natural metric of Hamming distance. Namely, the distance between the
original and perturbed instances x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n is the number of locations that they are different. This class
of distributions already include many learning problems of interest. So, by studying adversarial risk and
robustness for such a natural distribution, we can immediately obtain results for a broad class of problems.
We believe it is crucial to understand adversarial risk and robustness for natural distributions (e.g., Un
uniform over the hypercube) and metrics (e.g., the Hamming distance) to develop a theory of adversarial
risk and robustness that can ultimately shed light on the power and limitations of robust classification for
practical data sets. Furthermore, natural distributions like Un model a broad class of learning problems
directly; e.g., see [BFJ+94, SM00, JS06, Sel09]. The hope is that understanding the limitations of robust
learning for these basic natural distributions will ultimately shed light on challenges related to addressing
broader problems of interest.
Related previous work. The work of Gilmer et al. [GMF+18] studied the above problem for the special
case of input distributions that are uniform over unit spheres in dimension n. They showed that for any
classification problem with such input distribution, so long as there is an initial constant error probability
µ, the robustness under the ℓ2 norm is at most O(
√
n). Fawzi et al. [FFF18] studied the above question for
Gaussian distributions in dimension n and showed that when the input distribution has ℓ2 norm ≈ 1, then
by ≈ √n perturbations in ℓ2 norm, we can make the classifier change its prediction (but doing this does not
guarantee that the perturbed instance x′ will be misclassified). Schmidt et al. [SST+18] proved limits on
robustness of classifying uniform instances by specific classifiers and using a definition based on “corrupted
inputs” (see Section 2), while we are mainly interested in bounds that apply to any classifiers and guarantee
misclassification of the adversarial inputs.
Discussion. Our negative results of this work, like other (current proved) bounds in the literature for adver-
sarial risk and robustness only apply to specific distributions that do not cover the case of distributions that
generate images, voices, or other practically interesting data. We see these results, however, as first steps
towards understanding the barriers against robustness. The negative results so far indicate similar phenom-
ena (e.g., relation to isoperimetric inequalities). Thus, as pointed out in [GMF+18], these works motivate a
deeper study of such inequalities for real data sets. Finally, as discussed in [FFF18], such theoretical attacks
could potentially imply direct attacks on real data, assuming the existence of smooth generative models for
latent vectors with theoretically nice distributions (e.g., Gaussian or uniform over {0, 1}n) into natural data.
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1.1 Our Contribution and Results
As mentioned above, our main goal is to understand inherent barriers against robust classification of adver-
sarial examples, and our focus is on the uniform distribution Un of instances. In order to achieve that goal,
we both do a definitions study and prove technical limitation results.
General definitions and a taxonomy. As the current literature contains multiple definitions of adversarial
risk and robustness, we start by giving a taxonomy for these definitions based on their direct goals. More
specifically, suppose x is an original instance that the adversary perturbs into a “close” instance x′. Suppose
h(x), h(x′) are the predictions of the hypothesis h(·) and c(x), c(x′) are the true labels of x, x′ defined by
the concept function c(·). To call x′ a successful “adversarial example”, a natural definition would compare
the predicted label h(x′) with some other “anticipated answer”. However, what h(x′) is exactly compared to
is where various definitions of adversarial examples diverge. We observe in Section 2 that the three possible
definitions (based on comparing h(x′) with either of h(x), c(x) or c(x′)) lead to three different ways of
defining adversarial risk and robustness. We then identify one of them (that compares h(x) with c(x′)) as
the one guaranteeing misclassification by pushing the instances to the error region. We also discuss natural
conditions under which these definitions coincide. However, these conditions do not hold in general.
A comparative study through monotone conjunctions. We next ask: how close/far are these definitions
in settings where, e.g., the instances are drawn from the uniform distribution? To answer this question,
we make a comparative study of adversarial risk and robustness for a particular case of learning monotone
conjunctions under the uniform distribution Un (over {0, 1}n). A monotone conjunction f is a function of
the form f = (xi1 ∧ · · · ∧ xik). This class of functions is perhaps one of the most natural and basic learning
problems that are studied in computational learning theory as it encapsulates, in the most basic form, the
class of functions that determine which features should be included as relevant for a prediction mechanism.
For example, Valiant in [Val09] used this class of functions under Un to exemplify the framework of evolv-
ability. We attack monotone conjunctions under Un in order to contrast different behavior of definitions of
adversarial risk and robustness.
In Section 3, we show that previous definitions of robustness that are not based on the error region,
lead to bounds that do not equate the bounds provided by the error-region approach. We do so by first
deriving theorems that characterize the adversarial risk and robustness of a given hypothesis and a concept
function under the uniform distribution. Subsequently, by performing experiments we show that, on average,
hypotheses computed by two popular algorithms (FIND-S [Mit97] and SWAPPING ALGORITHM [Val09])
also exhibit the behavior that is predicted by the theorems. Estimating the (expected value of) the adversarial
risk and robustness of hypotheses produced by other classic algorithms under specific distributions, or for
other concept classes, is an interesting future work.
Inherent bounds for any classification task under the uniform distribution. Finally, after establishing
further motivation to use the error-region definition as the default definition for studying adversarial ex-
amples in general settings, we turn into studying inherent obstacles against robust classification when the
instances are drawn from the uniform distribution. We prove that for any learning problem P with input
distribution Un (i.e., uniform over the hypercube) and for any classifier h for P with a constant error µ, the
robustness of h to adversarial perturbations (in Hamming distance) is at most O(
√
n). We also show that by
the same amount of O(
√
n) perturbations in the worst case, one can increase the risk to 0.99. Table 1 lists
some numerical examples.
4
Table 1: Each row focuses on the number of tampered bits to achieve its stated goal. The second column
shows results using direct calculations for specific dimensions. The third column shows that these results
are indeed achieved in the limit, and the last column shows bounds proved for all n.
Types of bounds
Adversarial goals n = 103, 104, 105 n 7→ ∞ all n
From initial risk 0.01 to 0.99 ≈ 2.34√n < 2.34√n < 3.04√n
From initial risk 0.01 to 0.50 ≈ 1.17√n < 1.17√n < 1.52√n
Robustness for initial risk 0.01 ≈ 1.17√n < 1.17√n < 1.53√n
To prove results above, we apply the isoperimetric inequality of [Nig67, Har66] to the error region of
the classifier h and the ground truth c. In particular, it was shown in [Har66, Nig67] that the subsets of the
hypercube with minimum “expansion” (under Hamming distance) are Hamming balls. This fact enables us
to prove our bounds on the risk. We then prove the bounds on robustness by proving a general connection
between risk and robustness that might obe of independent interest. Using the central limit theorem, we
sharpen our bounds for robustness and obtain bounds that closely match the bounds that we also obtain by
direct calculations (based on the isoperimetric inequalities and picking Hamming balls as error region) for
specific values of dimension n = 103, 104, 105.
2 General Definitions of Adversarial Risk and Robustness
Notation. We use calligraphic letters (e.g., X ) for sets and capital non-calligraphic letters (e.g., D) for
distributions. By x ← D we denote sampling x from D. In a classification problem P = (X ,Y,D, C,H),
the set X is the set of possible instances, Y is the set of possible labels, D is a set of distributions over X , C is
a class of concept functions, andH is a class of hypotheses, where any f ∈ C∪H is a mapping from X to Y .
An example is a labeled instance. We did not state the loss function explicitly, as we work with classification
problems, however all main three definitions of this section directly extend to arbitrary loss functions. For
x ∈ X , c ∈ C,D ∈ D, the risk or error of a hypothesis h ∈ H is the expected (0-1) loss of (h, c) with respect
to D, namely Risk(h, c,D) = Prx←D[h(x) 6= c(x)]. We are usually interested in learning problems with
a fixed distribution D = {D}, as we are particularly interested in robustness of learning under the uniform
distribution Un over {0, 1}n. Note that since we deal with negative results, fixing the distribution only
makes our results stronger. As a result, whenever D = {D}, we omit D from the risk notation and simply
write Risk(h, c). We usually work with problems P = (X ,Y,D, C,H,d) that include a metric d over the
instances. For a set S ⊆ X we let d(x,S) = inf{d(x, y) | y ∈ S} and Ballr(x) = {x′ | d(x, x′) ≤ r}. By
HD we denote Hamming distance for pairs of instances from {0, 1}n. Finally, we use the term adversarial
instance to refer to an adversarially perturbed instance x′ of an originally sampled instance x when the label
of the adversarial example is either not known or not considered.
2.1 Different Definitions and Qualitative Comparisons
Below we present formal definitions of adversarial risk and robustness. In all of these definitions we will deal
with attackers who perturb the initial test instance x into a close adversarial instance x′. We will measure
how much an adversary can increase the risk by perturbing a given input x into a close adversarial example
x′. These definitions differ in when to call x′ a successful adversarial example. First we formalize the main
definition that we use in this work based on adversary’s ability to push instances to the error region.
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Definition 2.1 (Error-region risk and robustness). Let P = (X ,Y,D, C,H,d) be a classification problem
(with metric d defined over instances X ).
• Risk. For any r ∈ R+, h ∈ H, c ∈ C, the error-region risk under r-perturbation is
Risk
ER
r (h, c) = Pr
x←D
[∃x′ ∈ Ballr(x), h(x′) 6= c(x′)] .
For r = 0, RiskERr (h, c) = Risk(h, c) becomes the standard notion of risk.
• Robustness. For any h ∈ H, x ∈ X , c ∈ C, the error-region robustness is the expected distance of a
sampled instance to the error region, formally defined as follows
Rob
ER(h, c) = E
x←D
[
inf{r : ∃x′ ∈ Ballr(x), h(x′) 6= c(x′)}
]
.
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Figure 1: The three main definitions based on what
h(x′) is compared with.
Definition 2.1 requires the adversarial instance
x′ to bemisclassified, namely, h(x′) 6= c(x′). So, x′
clearly belongs to the error region of the hypothesis
h compared to the ground truth c. This definition
is implicit in the work of [GMF+18]. In what fol-
lows, we compare our main definition above with
previously proposed definitions of adversarial risk
and robustness found in the literature and discuss
when they are (or when they are not) equivalent to
Definition 2.1. Figure 1 summarizes the differences
between the three main definitions that have ap-
peared in the literature, where we distinguish cases
by comparing the classifier’s prediction h(x′) at the
new point x′ with either of h(x), c(x), or c(x′),
leading to three different definitions.
Definitions based on hypothesis’s prediction change (PC risk and robustness). Many works, including
the works of [SZS+14, FFF18] use a definition of robustness that compares classifier’s prediction h(x′) with
the prediction h(x) on the original instance x. Namely, they require h(x′) 6= h(x) rather than h(x′) 6= c(x′)
in order to consider x′ an adversarial instance. Here we refer to this definition (that does not depend on
the ground truth c) as prediction-change (PC) risk and robustness (denoted as RiskPCr (h) and Rob
PC(h)).
We note that this definition captures the error-region risk and robustness if we assume the initial correctness
(i.e., h(x) = c(x)) of classifier’s prediction on all x ← X and “truth proximity”, i.e., that c(x) = c(x′)
holds for all x′ that are “close” to x. Both of these assumptions are valid in some natural scenarios. For
example, when input instances consist of images that look similar to humans (if used as the ground truth
c(·)) and if h is also correct on the original (non-adversarial) test examples, then the two definitions (based
on error region or prediction change) coincide. But, these assumptions do not hold in in general.
We note that there is also a work in the direction of finding adversarial instances that may potentially
fool humans that have limited time to decide for their label, as in [ESC+18]. The images of [ESC+18] are
sufficiently ‘confusing’ that answers of the form “I do not know” are very plausible from the humans that are
asked. This fuzzy classification that allows “I do not know” answers is reminiscent of the limited member-
ship query model of Sloan and Turán [ST94] (which is a worst-case version of the incomplete membership
querymodel of Angluin and Slonim [AS94]; see also [AKST97] and [SST10] for further related discussions)
as well as of the model of learning from a consistently ignorant teacher of Frazier et al. [FGMP96].
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Definitions based on the notion of corrupted instance (CI risk and robustness). The works of [MRT15,
FMS15, FMS18, AKM18] study the robustness of learning models in the presence of corrupted inputs. A
more recent framework was developed in [MMS+18, SST+18] for modeling risk and robustness that is
inspired by robust optimization [BTGN09] (with an underlying metric space) and model adversaries that
corrupt the the original instance in (exponentially more) ways. When studying adversarial perturbations
using corrupted instances, we define adversarial risk by requiring the adversarial instance x′ to satisfy
h(x′) 6= c(x). The term “corrupted instance” is particularly helpful as it emphasizes on the fact that the
goal (of the classifier) is to find the true label of the original (uncorrupted) instance x, while we are only
given a corrupted version x′. Hence, we refer to this definition as the corrupted instance (CI) risk and
robustness and denote them by RiskCIr (h, c) and Rob
CI(h, c). The advantage of this definition compared
to the prediction-change based definitions is that here, we no longer need to assume the initial correctness
assumption. Namely, only if the “truth proximity” assumption holds, then we have c(x) = c(x′) which
together with the condition h(x′) 6= c(x) we can conclude that x′ is indeed misclassified. However, if small
perturbations can change the ground truth, c(x′) can be different from c(x), in which case, it is no long clear
whether x′ is misclassified or not.
Stronger definitions with more restrictions on adversarial instance. The corrupted-input definition
requires an adversarial instance x′ to satisfy h(x′) 6= c(x), and the error-region definition requires h(x′) 6=
c(x′). What if we require both of these conditions to call x′ a true adversarial instance? This is indeed the
definition used in the work of Suggala et al. [SPNR18], though more formally in their work, they subtract
the original risk (without adversarial perturbation) from the adversarial risk. This definition is certainly a
stronger guarantee for the adversarial instance. Therefore, we simply refer to risk and robustness under this
condition as strong adversarial risk and robustness. As this definition is a hybrid of the error-region and
corrupted-instance definitions, we do not make a direct study of this definition and only focus on the other
three definitions described above.
How about when the classifier h is 100% correct? We emphasize that when h happens to be the same
function as c, (the error region) Definition 2.1 implies h has zero adversarial risk and infinite adversar-
ial robustness RobER(h, c) = ∞. This is expected, as there is no way an adversary can perturb any in-
put x into a misclassified x′. However, both of the definitions of risk and robustness based on prediction
change [SZS+14] and corrupted instance [MRT15, MMS+18] could compute large risk and small robust-
ness for such h. In fact, in a recent work [TSE+18] it is shown that for definitions based on corrupted input,
correctness might be provably at odds with robustness in some cases. Therefore, even though all these def-
initions could perhaps be used to approximate the risk and robustness when we do not have access to the
ground truth c′ on the new point x′, in this work we separate the definition of risk and robustness from how
to compute/approximate them, so we will use Definition 2.1 by default.
2.2 Various Aspects of the Attack Models
We emphasize that the definitions of Section 2.1 are all information theoretic and do not address the effi-
ciency of the adversary who perturbs the original instance x into x′. Moreover, there are other aspects of the
attack that are implicit in the definitions Section 2.1 in terms of what adversary does or does not have access
to during the course of the attack. Below, we briefly point out these other aspects.
• Efficiency. This aspect of an attack could come in two flavor. One way to mathematically formalize
“efficient” attacks is to use polynomial-time attacks as it is done in cryptography. Another way is to
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use information theoretic attacks without the efficiency requirements. Security against information
theoretic attacks are stronger, while attacks of polynomial-time form are stronger.
• Information access. The other aspect of the attack is about what adversary has access to during the
attack and how it can access this information. We separate thes aspects as follows.
– What to access. In general, we can consider attacks that do or do not access to either of the
ground truth c, the hypothesis h, or distribution D.
– How to access. If the attack can depend on a function f (e.g., f = h or f = c) or a distribution
D it can still access this information in various forms. An information theoretic attack can
completely depend on the full description of f , while an efficient (polynomial time attack) can
use oracle access to f (regardless of efficiency of f itself) or a sampler for D. In fact, if f (or
a sampler for a distribution D) has a compact representation, then an efficient attacker can also
fully depend on f or D if that representation is given.
Going back to the definitions of Section 2, by “∃x′ ∈ Ballr(x), P (x′)” we simply state the existence of
a close instance x′ with a property P (x′) while it might be computationally infeasible to actually find such
an x′. Moreover, the definitions of Section 2 assume the adversary has full access to f, c,D.
3 A Comparative Study through Monotone Conjunctions
In this section, we compare the risk and robustness under the three definitions of Section 2 through a study
of monotone conjunctions under the uniform distribution. Namely, we consider adversarial perturbations
of truth assignments that are drawn from the uniform distribution Un over {0, 1}n when the concept class
contains monotone conjunctions. As we will see, these definitions diverge in this natural case. Below we fix
the setup under which all the subsequent results are obtained.
Problem Setup 1. Let Cn be the concept class of all monotone conjunctions formed by at least one and at
most n Boolean variables. The target concept (ground truth) c that needs to be learned is drawn from Cn.
Let the hypothesis class be H = Cn and let h ∈ H be the hypothesis obtained by a learning algorithm after
processing the training data. With |h| and |c| we denote the size of h and c respectively; that is, number of
variables that h and c contain.2 Now let,
c =
m∧
i=1
xi ∧
u∧
k=1
yk and h =
m∧
i=1
xi ∧
w∧
ℓ=1
zℓ . (1)
We will call the variables that appear both in h and c as mutual, the variables that appear in c but not in h
as undiscovered, and the variables that appear in h but not in c as wrong (or redundant). Therefore in (1)
we have m mutual variables, u undiscovered and w wrong. We denote the error region of a hypothesis h
and the target concept c with E (h, c).
That is, E (h, c) = {x ∈ {0, 1}n | h(x) 6= c(x)}. The probability mass of the error region between h
and c, denoted by µ, under the uniform distribution Un over {0, 1}n is then,
Pr
x←Un
[x ∈ E (h, c)] = µ = (2w + 2u − 2) · 2−m−u−w . (2)
2 For example, h1 = x1 ∧ x5 ∧ x8 is a monotone conjunction of three variables in a space where we have n ≥ 8 variables and
|h1| = 3.
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In this problem setup we are interested in computing the adversarial risk and robustness that attackers can
achieve when instances are drawn from the uniform distribution Un over {0, 1}n.
Remark 3.1. Note that µ is a variable that depends on the particular h and c.
Remark 3.2. Connecting to our discussion from Section 2.2, adversaries who have oracle access to such
hypotheses can identify the variables that appear in them and so reconstruct them efficiently as follows.
Since xone = 〈1, 1, 1, . . . , 1〉 is always positive one can query all the n vectors that have all 1’s but one 0,
and thus determine all the variables that appear in a particular hypothesis.
Using the Problem Setup 1, in what follows we compute the adversarial risk and robustness that an
arbitrary hypothesis has against an arbitrary target using the error region (ER) definition that we advocate
in contexts where the perturbed input is supposed to be misclassified and do the same calculations for
adversarial risk and robustness that are based on the definitions of prediction change (PC) and corrupted
instance (CI). The adversarial robustness of a solution using the prediction change and corrupted instance
definitions is proportional to the size (number of variables) of the learned solution; experimentally we obtain
that it is proportional to about half the number of variables that the hypothesis contains. On the other
hand, the adversarial robustness of a learned solution using the error region definition is proportional to the
minimum between the size of the hypothesis and the size of the target; experimentally we obtain that it is
proportional to about half that minimum value. In other words, for a hypothesis that has many variables
and a target that has fairly few variables, the prediction change and corrupted instance definitions imply
large robustness for the learned solution, whereas the adversarial robustness as implied by the error region
definition is low. This last setup is precisely the case for a large set of target functions when PAC learning
monotone conjunctions with the FIND-S algorithm; see Section 3.4
3.1 Error Region Risk and Robustness
Theorem 3.3 (Error region risk - lower bound). Consider the Problem Setup 1. Then, if h = c, we have
Risk
ER
r (h, c) = 0, while if h 6= c, then, with a perturbation budget of r we can obtain the following lower
bounds.
• If 0 ≤ r ≤ ⌊m/2⌋, then RiskERr (h, c) ≥ µ ·
∑r
j=0
(m
j
)
, where µ is given by (2).
• If ⌊m2 ⌋+ 1 ≤ r = ⌊m2 ⌋+ γ ≤ ⌊m2 ⌋+ ⌊min{u,w}2 ⌋, then
Risk
ER
r (h, c) ≥
1
4
· 2−min{u,w} ·
γ∑
ζ=1
(
min{u,w}
ζ
)
.
• If ⌊m2 ⌋+ ⌊min{u,w}2 ⌋+ 1 ≤ r ≤ min{|h| , |c|}, then RiskERr (h, c) ≥ 18 .
• If 1 + min{|h| , |c|} ≤ r, then RiskERr (h, c) = 1.
Proof Sketch. Assume that h 6= c, since otherwise the risk is 0.
We distinguish cases for the various values thatm,u,w can take in (1): (i)m = 0, (ii)m ≥ 1 and u = 0
and w ≥ 1, (iii) m ≥ 1 and u ≥ 1 and w = 0, and finally, (iv) the more general case, where m ≥ 1,
u ≥ 1 and w ≥ 1. Below we will prove fully the more involved case, case (iv); the other cases can easily
be obtained using (iv) as a guide. Furthermore, we distinguish between two main cases: having a budget
r ≤ min{|h| , |c|} versus having a budget of r > min{|h| , |c|}.
Case 1: Budget 0 ≤ r ≤ min{|h| , |c|}. We distinguish cases based on the relationship between the
prediction and the true label of a randomly drawn instance.
Case 1A: Budget 0 ≤ r ≤ min{|h| , |c|} and instance x such that h(x) 6= c(x). When h and c dis-
agree, this means that x ∈ E (h, c) and hence without the need of any budget (i.e., r = 0) all these
truth assignments contribute to the risk of the hypothesis. By (2) we obtain such an x with probability
(2w + 2u − 2) · 2−m−u−w = µ = µ · (m0 ).
Case 1B: Budget 0 ≤ r ≤ min{|h| , |c|} and instance x such that h(x) = c(x) = 1. With probabil-
ity 2−m−u−w, x satisfies both c and h. Since h 6= c there is at least one variable that appears in either
c or h but not in both. Therefore, with a budget of r ≥ 1 we can flip that one bit in x that corresponds
to that variable and the resulting x′ will be misclassified.
Case 1C: Budget 0 ≤ r ≤ min{|h| , |c|} and instance x such that h(x) = c(x) = 0. With probabil-
ity 1−µ− 2−m−u−w, x falsifies both c and h. We distinguish cases further based on the range of the
budget r that is provided to us.
Case 1C1: 0 ≤ r ≤ ⌊m/2⌋. We look at truth assignments that have 1 ≤ j ≤ r ≤ ⌊m/2⌋ 0’s
among the m mutual variables and further have: (i) 1 ≤ ζ ≤ u undiscovered variables falsified
and all the w wrong variables satisfied, and (ii) all the u undiscovered variables satisfied and
1 ≤ ξ ≤ w wrong variables falsified. With a budget of r, the contribution to the adversarial risk
by these assignments is,
2−m−u−w
r∑
j=1
(
m
j
)(w
0
) u∑
ζ=1
(
u
ζ
)
+
(
u
0
) w∑
ξ=1
(
w
ξ
)
which is,
[
2−m−u + 2−m−w − 21−m−u−w]∑rj=1 (mj ) and by (2) it is µ ·∑rj=1 (mj ).
Case 1C2: ⌊m
2
⌋+ 1 ≤ r ≤ ⌊m
2
⌋+ ⌊min{u,w}
2
⌋. Assume3 that 1 ≤ u ≤ w ⇒ |c| ≤ |h|. We look
at the truth assignments where we have at most ⌊m/2⌋ 0’s among the m mutual variables and
further we have γ 0’s where γ ≥ 1 among the u undiscovered variables plus at least one 0 among
the w wrong variables. With a budget of r = ⌊m2 ⌋+γ we flip the 0’s that exist among the mutual
variables plus the γ undiscovered variables that are currently falsified in x and thus we hit the
error region. Therefore, the contribution to the adversarial risk by these truth assignments alone
is,
2−m−u−w
⌊m/2⌋∑
j=0
(
m
j
) w∑
ξ=1
(
w
ξ
) γ∑
ζ=1
(
u
ζ
)
which is, 12 · (1 − 2−w) · 2−u ·
∑γ
ζ=1
(u
ζ
) ≥ 14 · 2−u ·∑γζ=1 (uζ). (In the opposite case, where
1 ≤ w < u we obtain a lower bound of 14 · 2−w ·
∑γ
ζ=1
(u
ζ
)
that explains the statement of the
theorem.)
Case 1C3: ⌊m
2
⌋+ ⌊min{u,w}
2
⌋+ 1 ≤ r ≤ m+min{u,w}. Assume that u ≤ w. (Again, the
opposite case is symmetric.)
3The opposite case where w ≤ u is symmetric. Also, u,w > 0 since we explore case (iv), the more general case for the proof,
wherem ≥ 1, u ≥ 1 and w ≥ 1.
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We look at the truth assignments where we have at most ⌊m/2⌋ many 0’s among the m mutual
variables and further we have at most 1 + ⌊u/2⌋ many 0’s among the u undiscovered variables
plus at least one 0 among the w wrong variables. With a budget of r ≥ ⌊m2 ⌋ + ⌊u/2⌋ + 1 we
flip the 0’s that exist among the mutual variables plus the 0’s that exist among the undiscovered
variables and thus we hit the error region. Therefore, the contribution to the adversarial risk by
these truth assignments alone is,
2−m−u−w
⌊m/2⌋∑
j=0
(
m
j
) 1+⌊u/2⌋∑
ζ=1
(
u
ζ
) w∑
ξ=1
(
w
ξ
)
.
By Lemma A.1,
∑⌊m/2⌋
j=0
(
m
j
) ≥ 2m−1 as well as ∑1+⌊u/2⌋ζ=1 (uζ) ≥ ∑⌊u/2⌋ζ=0 (uζ) ≥ 2u−1, we
obtain the lower bound, 2−m−u−w · 2m−1 · 2u−1 · (2w − 1) = 14 · (1− 2−w) ≥ 18 .
Case 2: Budget r ≥ 1+min{|h| , |c|}. The risk 1 since we can hit the error region by making at most
1+min{|h| , |c|} changes in any given truth assignment. This worst case scenario can be observed when h is
a specialization of c (or vice versa) and in particular for truth assignments where all the m mutual variables
are falsified as well as all the wrong (resp., undiscovered) variables are satisfied. Then, we need to flip the
m = min{|h| , |c|} mutual variables plus one more among the wrong (resp., undiscovered) in order to hit
the error region.
Theorem 3.4 (Error region robustness). Consider the Problem Setup 1. Then, RobER(h, c) = ∞ when
h = c, while if h 6= c we have,
1
16
·min{|h| , |c|} ≤ RobER(h, c) ≤ 1 + min{|h| , |c|}.
Proof Sketch. h = c⇒ RobER(h, c) =∞. Hence, below we will examine the case where h 6= c.
As in Theorem 3.3 below we prove fully case (iv) where m ≥ 1, u ≥ 1 and w ≥ 1. Using the analysis
that we present below for case (iv) as a guide, we can easily show for the other cases that they also satisfy
min{|h| , |c|}/16 ≤ RobER(h, c) ≤ 1 + min{|h| , |c|}. .
Case m ≥ 1, u ≥ 1 and w ≥ 1. We can ignore the instances that are drawn from the error region. If
x ∈ E (h, c), then these instances do not increase the robustness of h. By (2) such instances are drawn with
probability µ = (2w + 2u − 2) · 2−m−u−w.
Lower Bound. We examine the case where |c| ≤ |h|. The case |c| > |h| can be handled symmetrically.
First, |c| ≤ |h| ⇒ u ≤ w. We now look at the following falsifying truth assignments in order to obtain a
lower bound. Let x falsify 1 ≤ j ≤ m variables that mutually appear between h and c. Further, let x falsify
ζ ≥ 1 more variables among the u that appear only in c and ξ ≥ 0 more variables among the w that appear
only in h. Then, we can perturb x into an x′ ∈ E (h, c) by changing σ = j + min{ζ, ξ} coordinates. The
contribution to the overall robustness is then,
2−m−w−u
m∑
j=1
u∑
ζ=1
r∑
ξ=0
(
m
j
)(
u
ζ
)(
w
ξ
)
(j +min{ζ, ξ}) .
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Letting the above quantity be Q we have,
Q = 2−m−w−u
m∑
j=1
j
(
m
j
) u∑
ζ=1
(
u
ζ
) w∑
ξ=0
(
w
ξ
)
+ 2−m−w−u
m∑
j=1
(
m
j
) u∑
ζ=1
ζ
(
u
ζ
) w∑
ξ=ζ
(
w
ξ
)
+ 2−m−w−u
m∑
j=1
(
m
j
) u∑
ζ=1
(
u
ζ
) ζ−1∑
ξ=0
ξ
(
w
ξ
)
.
where, by dropping the last term and applying Lemma A.5 we obtain, Q ≥ 2−m−u(2u − 1)m2m−1 + u8 ·
2u+w · 2−m−w−u∑mj=1 (mj ). Thus, Q ≥ m2 (1− 2−u) + u8 (1− 2−m) ≥ min{|h| , |c|}/16.
Upper Bound. First, if x ∈ E (h, c), then we need to modify σ = 0 coordinates in x so that the perturbed
instance x′ is in the error region. Second, if x is a satisfying truth assignment for both h and c, then since
h and c differ in at least one variable, making that variable in x equal to 0 will result in an x′ ∈ E (h, c).
Therefore, we need to modify σ = 1 coordinates in x in this case so that x′ ∈ E (h, c). Finally, if x
is a falsifying truth assignment for both h and c, then the minimum perturbation is obtained by flipping
σ ≤ (1+min{|h| , |c|}) 0’s to 1’s. Therefore, we need to perturb σ ≤ 1+min{|h| , |c|} coordinates in x in
every case so that for the perturbed instance x′ it holds x′ ∈ E (h, c).
3.2 Prediction Change Risk and Robustness
Theorem 3.5 (Prediction change risk). Consider the Problem Setup 1. Then, RiskPCr (h) = 0 when r = 0,
while when r ≥ 1 we have,
Risk
PC
r (h) = 2
−|h| ·
r∑
i=0
(|h|
i
)
.
Proof. With a budget of r = 0 we can not change the evaluation of h at any instance, so the prediction
change adversarial risk is 0.
Now consider the case where we have a budget of 1 ≤ r < |h|. A satisfying truth assignment x (which
arises with probability 2−|h|) requires a budget of only r = 1 in order to become falsifying. For a falsifying
truth assignment x that has i 0’s among the |h| variables that appear in hwe need a budget of i. Therefore, for
a budget of 1 ≤ r < |h| we can violate∑ri=1 (|h|i )2n−|h| truth assignments that were originally falsifying.
Of course if we have a budget of r ≥ |h|, then we can change any x to an x′ such that h(x) 6= h(x′) and
therefore the overall risk is going to be 1. In other words, for the interesting cases where 1 ≤ r < |h| we
have RiskPCr (h) = 2
−|h| + 2−n ·∑ri=1 (|h|i )2n−|h| = 2−|h|∑ri=0 (|h|i ). This last formula is also consistent
with budget r ≥ |h| as then RiskPCr (h) = 1.
Theorem 3.6 (Prediction change robustness). Consider the Problem Setup 1. Then,
Rob
PC(h) =
1
2
· |h|+ 2−|h| .
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Proof. When x is a satisfying truth assignment for h then it suffices to turn a single 1 into a 0 for one of the
variables that appear in h so that the resulting x′ is such so that h(x) 6= h(x′). When x is a falsifying truth
assignment for hwith i out of the |h| variables that appear in h being 1, then we need to flip σ = |h|−i bits in
x for the prediction to change. Therefore, RobPC(h) = 2−n ·1·2n−|h|+2−n ·∑|h|−1i=0 (|h|−i)·(|h|i )·2n−|h| =
2−|h| + 2−|h| ·∑|h|j=1 j · (|h|j ) = 2−|h| + |h| /2.
3.3 Corrupted Instance Risk and Robustness
In the theorem below the important message is that driving the adversarial risk to 1 based on the corrupted
instance definition requires budget Θ(|h|) contrasting the budget of size Θ(min{|h| , |c|}) that is required
in Theorem 3.3 in order to drive the adversarial risk to 1 based on the error region definition. The other cases
in the statement below refer to intermediate values of budget and explain how we arrive at this conclusion.
Theorem 3.7 (Corrupted instance risk). Consider the Problem Setup 1. Then, for a budget of size r we have,
• if r = 0, then RiskCIr (h, c) = µ = (2
w + 2u − 2) · 2−m−u−w ,
• if 1 ≤ r < w, then RiskCIr (h, c) = 2−|c| + 2−|h|
(∑r
j=0
(|h|
j
)− 2−u∑rξ=0 (wξ)) ,
• if w ≤ r < |h|, then RiskCIr (h, c) = 2−|h| ·
∑r
j=0
(|h|
j
)
,
• if |h| ≤ r, then RiskCIr (h, c) = 1 .
Proof. When x ∈ E (h, c), all these instances contribute to the adversarial risk, for any budget value (in-
cluding r = 0), since they satisfy h(x) = h(x′) 6= c(x). The probability of obtaining such an x is, by (2),
(2w + 2u − 2) · 2−m−u−w.
When x is a satisfying truth assignment for both h and c, then we need to flip σ = 1 bits. Therefore
with a budget of 1, when either h or c (or both) are satisfied, then these truth assignments contribute to the
risk an amount of 2−m−u + 2−m−w − 2−m−u−w.
When x is a falsifying truth assignment for both h and c we have the following two cases.
• When x falsifies 1 ≤ j ≤ m mutual and 0 ≤ ξ ≤ w wrong variables, we need to perturb σ = j + ξ
bits so that h(x′) 6= c(x). Therefore with a budget of r we can increase the risk by an amount of
2−m−w
r∑
j=1
((
m+ w
j
)
−
(
w
j
))
.
• When no mutual variable is falsified (or there are no mutual variables between h and c), but x falsifies
1 ≤ ζ ≤ u undiscovered and 1 ≤ ξ ≤ w wrong variables, then we need to perturb σ = ξ bits. Hence,
with a budget of r we can increase the risk by an amount of 2−m−u−w(2u − 1)∑rξ=1 (wξ).
We now add everything up.
Theorem 3.8 (Corrupted instance robustness). Consider the Problem Setup 1. Then,
1
4
· |h| < RobCI(h, c) < |h|+ 1
2
.
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Proof. First note that instances in the error region contribute precisely 0 to the overall robustness, regardless
if we are looking for a lower bound or an upper bound on the robustness.
For the lower bound consider truth assignments that are falsifying both h and c such that the following
variables are falsified: 1 ≤ j ≤ m mutual variables, 0 ≤ ζ ≤ u undiscovered variables, and 0 ≤ ξ ≤ w
wrong variables. So that we can achieve h(x′) 6= c(x), we need an x′ such that h(x′) = 1. But then this
means that we need to flip σ = j + ξ bits in x in this case. As a result, the contribution of these truth
assignments to the overall robustness of h is,
Q1 = 2
−m−w−u
m∑
j=1
(
m
j
) u∑
ζ=0
(
u
ζ
) w∑
ξ=0
(
w
ξ
)
· (j + ξ)
=
m
2
+
w
2
· (1− 2−m) ≥ m
2
+
w
4
>
m+ w
4
=
|h|
4
.
For the upper bound, for a truth assignment x that is falsifying both h and c we need to change no more
than |h| bits in x so that for the perturbed instance x′ it holds h(x′) = 1 6= 0 = h(x) = c(x). As the
probability of obtaining such a truth assignment x is strictly less than 1, then the contribution to the overall
robustness due to such truth assignments is strictly less than |h|. On the other hand, for satisfying truth
assignments of both h and c we have σ = 1 bits that need to change in x and therefore the contribution to
the overall robustness is 2−m−u−w ≤ 1/2.
3.4 Experiments for the Expected Values of Adversarial Robustness
In this part, we complement the theorems that we presented earlier with experiments. This way we are
able to examine how some popular algorithms behave under attack, and we explore the extent to which
the generated solutions of such algorithms exhibit differences in their (adversarial) robustness on average
against various target functions drawn from the class of monotone conjunctions.
Overview of algorithms. The first algorithm is the standard Occam algorithm that starts from the full
conjunction and eliminates variables from the hypothesis that contradict the positive examples received; this
algorithm is known as FIND-S in [Mit97] because it maintains the most specific hypothesis in the version
space [Mit77] induced by the training data, but has appeared without a name earlier by Valiant in [Val84]
and its roots are at least as old as in [BGA57]. The second algorithm is the SWAPPING ALGORITHM from
the framework of evolvability [Val09]. This algorithm searches for an ε-optimal solution among monotone
conjunctions that have at most ⌈lg(3/(2ε))⌉ variables in their representation using a local search method
where hypotheses in the neighborhood are obtained by swapping in and out some variable(s) from the
current hypothesis; in particular we follow the analysis that was used in [DT09] and is a special case of the
analysis used in [Dio16].
Experimental setup. In each experiment, we first learn hypotheses by using the algorithms under Un
against different target sizes. For both algorithms, during the learning process, we use ε = 0.01 and δ =
0.05 for the learning parameters. We then examine the robustness of the generated hypotheses by drawing
examples again from the uniform distribution Un as this is the main theme of this paper. In particular, we test
against the 30 target sizes from the set {1, 2, . . . , 24, 25, 30, 50, 75, 99, 100}. For each such target size, we
plot the average value, over 500 runs, of the robustness of the learned hypothesis that we obtain. In each run,
we repeat the learning process using a random target of the particular size as well as a fresh training sample
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and subsequently estimate the robustness of the learned hypothesis by drawing another 10, 000 examples
from Un that we violate (depending on the definition). The dimension of the instances is n = 100.
3.4.1 The Algorithm FIND-S
Algorithm FIND-S is shown in Algorithm 1. The initial hypothesis is the full monotone conjunction and
as positive examples are received during training, the learner drops from the hypothesis those variables
that are falsified in the positive examples. Following the Problem Setup 1, the concept class Cn contains
|Cn| = 2n − 1 monotone conjunctions since the empty conjunction is not part of the class. Similarly, the
hypothesis class is H = Cn. So, in particular for our experiments we have |H| = 2100 − 1 since n = 100.
Therefore, we use a sample of sizem = ⌈1ε ln (|H| /δ)⌉ = 7232 which is enough (see, e.g., [BEHW87]) for
learning any finite concept class of size |H| up to risk ε, with probability at least 1−δ, under any distribution
and in particular under the uniform distribution Un as in our experiments.
Algorithm 1: An Occam algorithm for efficiently PAC learning monotone conjunctions
Input: dimension n ∈ N∗, δ ∈ (0, 1), ε ∈ (0, 1)
Output: a hypothesis h ∈ Cn
1 h← ∧ni=1xi;
2 Drawm =
⌈
1
ε
· ln (|H| /δ)
⌉
examples;
3 for j ← 1 up tom do
4 if j-th example is positive then remove from h all the variables that are falsified in the example ;
5 return h;
As we proved in Theorems 3.6 and 3.8 the robustness of the learned hypothesis is proportional to the
size of the hypothesis regardless of the size of the target when using the definitions of prediction change
and corrupted instance (and in fact, experimentally the robustness in both cases is about |h| /2). However,
the robustness of the hypothesis using the error region approach is proportional to the minimum between
the size of the hypothesis and the size of the target. Now note that the way FIND-S constructs solutions,
it holds that |c| = min{|h| , |c|}. As such, when the target is sufficiently large (e.g., |c| ≥ 20), then the
learned hypothesis using FIND-S is almost always the initial full conjunction of size 100 and therefore the
robustness based on the error region approach is proportional to |c| and not proportional to 100 (which is
the size of h) as it is the case of the robustness that is based on the prediction change and corrupted instance
definitions. In other words, the robustness obtained by the error region approach is significantly different
from the robustness obtained by the prediction change and corrupted instance approaches for a significant
range of target functions. Figure 2 presents the values of the three robustness measures when using the
FIND-S algorithm to form a hypothesis in our setup (ε = 0.01, etc.). Then, Figure 3 presents the average
size of the learned hypotheses and Figure 4 presents the average error of the hypotheses learned.
3.4.2 The SWAPPING ALGORITHM
The SWAPPING ALGORITHM appeared in Valiant’s framework of evolvability [Val09]. We give a brief de-
scription of this algorithm without going deeply in our discussions regarding fascinating details of the frame-
work of evolvability. Loosely speaking, in evolvability the idea is to develop an evolutionary mechanism
that allows near-optimal hypotheses to form by letting such hypotheses interact with the environment. Here
we describe the evolutionary mechanism as if it is deployed by some learner who knows how the evolution-
ary mechanism operates on hypotheses (organisms), how these hypotheses interact with the environment,
and how this interaction affects the hypothesis formation from one iteration (generation) to another.
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Figure 2: Experimental comparison of the different robustness measures. The values for PC and CI almost
coincide and they can hardly be distinguished. The value for ER robustness is completely different compared
to the other two. Note that ER robustness is∞ when the target size |c| is in {1, . . . , 8} ∪ {100} and for this
reason only the points between 9 and 99 are plotted. When |c| ≥ 20, almost always the learned hypothesis
is the initialized full conjunction. The reason is that positive examples are very rare and our training set
contains none. As a result no variable is eliminated from the initialized hypothesis h (full conjunction).
Hence, when |c| ≥ 20 we see that PC and CI robustness is about max{|h| , |c|}/2 = |h|/2, whereas ER is
roughly min{|h| , |c|}/2 = |c|/2.
First of all, the algorithm is a local-search method. At any given time the algorithm is maintaining
a hypothesis that is a monotone conjunction of some of the Boolean variables. For any given hypothesis
that the learner has formed, a mutator function (i) defines a neighborhood N(h)4 with hypotheses that can
potentially replace the current hypothesis of the learner, (ii) scores the candidates in the neighborhood based
on their predictive performance on samples of certain size, and (iii) uses a decision rule to determine which
hypothesis among the ones in the neighborhood will be selected as the hypothesis that the learner will have
during the next iteration (generation).
Neighborhood. The neighborhood N , can, in general, be decomposed into N = N+ ∪ N− ∪ N± ∪
{h}. The neighborhood N+ contains the hypotheses that have one more variable compared to the current
hypothesis h, the neighborhood N− contains the hypotheses that have one less variable compared to the
current hypothesis h, and the neighborhood N± contains the hypotheses that are obtained by swapping one
of the variables that appear in h with one of the variables that do not yet appear in h. As an example, let
h = x1 ∧ x2 and n = 3. Then, N− = {x1, x2}, N+ = {x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3}, and N± = {x1 ∧ x3, x2 ∧ x3}.
As we can see, the current hypothesis h is always in the neighborhood, so the learner can always retain its
current guess for the next iteration.5
4We will simply writeN instead of N(h), since the neighborhood always depends on the current hypothesis h.
5Additions and deletions can be seen as swaps with the constant 1. This swapping nature of the algorithm justifies its name that
was given in [DT09].
16
 80 85 90 95 100
hy
po
th
es
is 
siz
e 
|h|
target size |c|
1
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
1  5  10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
average hypothesis size
Figure 3: Average size, over 500 runs, for the computed hypothesis using FIND-S for learning monotone
conjunctions with a sample of size 7, 232 under the uniform distribution Un.
Weights. Each hypothesis in N+ ∪ N− ∪ {h} is assigned the same weight so that all these weights add
up to 1/2. Each hypothesis in N± is assigned the same weight so that the weights of all these hypotheses in
N± also add up to 1/2.
Scoring. The predictive power of each hypothesis in N is approximated, with high probability, within ǫs
of its true value, by testing its predictive performance on a sufficiently large sample.
Partitioning. The hypotheses in N are partitioned into three sets based on their predictive performance.
For a real constant t, called tolerance, and a base performance value νh for the current hypothesis h, the hy-
potheses that exhibit performance strictly larger than νh+ t form the beneficial group Bene, the hypotheses
that exhibit performance within νh ± t form the neutral set Neut, and finally the hypotheses that exhibit
performance strictly less than νh − t form a deleterious set.
Decision rule for mutator. If the set Bene is non-empty, then a hypothesis is selected from this set,
otherwise a hypothesis from the set Neut is selected. Note that Neut is always nonempty as the current
hypothesis is always there. When a hypothesis has to be selected among many from a set (whether Bene
or Neut), it is selected with probability proportional to its weight compared to the total weight of the
hypotheses in the set.
Hypothesis class H. For a threshold q = ⌈log2(3/(2ε))⌉ it can be shown [DT09] that, for any target
monotone conjunction from our concept class Cn in the Problem Setup 1, among the monotone conjunctions
that have up to q variables, there is at least one such conjunction that has risk at most ε. In particular, the
SWAPPING ALGORITHM will (i) identify precisely targets with up to q variables (i.e., generate a hypothesis
that achieves risk 0), or (ii) form a hypothesis with q variables that has risk at most ε for targets that have
size larger than q. Due to this property of the algorithm, a typical hypothesis class isH = C≤qn that contains
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Figure 4: Average error, over 500 runs, of the computed hypotheses using FIND-S for learning mono-
tone conjunctions with a sample of size 7, 243 under the uniform distribution Un. For target sizes
|c| ∈ {1, . . . , 8} ∪ {100}, the learner always identifies precisely the target and thus the error is precisely 0
in that regime. (For the case |c| = 100 the learner is lucky, as the initial guess is the target itself and thus
the hypothesis never changes as examples are being presented to the learner.) For target sizes |c| between
14 and 99 the average error is nonzero but less than 10−4 and decays as the size of the target increases. For
clarity we only plot target sizes between 1 and 25.
the monotone conjunctions that have 0 up to q variables. Therefore, we formally deviate from the hypothesis
class H = Cn found in our Problem Setup 1 - even though the algorithm can still run with this hypothesis
class and moreover in the end the algorithm will return a hypothesis that satisfies h ∈ Cn as in the Problem
Setup 1. This deviation on the hypothesis class is done on one hand for simplicity because it is easier to
explain the evolutionary mechanism, and on the other hand because such a selection of a hypothesis class
technically gives an algorithm in the non-realizable case of learning - which might be interesting in its own
right. For more information on these details we refer the reader to [DT09] and [Dio16].
The mutator function for the SWAPPING ALGORITHM is shown in Algorithm 2. The function SetWeight
assigns weights to the hypotheses as explained in the paragraph about assigning weights above. The function
Select returns a hypothesis from the set in its argument as explained in the paragraph above regarding the
decision rule for the mutator. The function Perf computes empirically the predictive performance of the
hypotheses within accuracy ǫs with probability at least 1− δs.
As mentioned above, for the solutions obtained by the SWAPPING ALGORITHM it holds that |h| =
min{|h| , |c|}. Thus, while we can observe some differences for a small range of target functions regarding
the robustness of the generated hypotheses based on the various definitions, these differences are smaller
compared to what we obtain with the FIND-S algorithm. Figure 5 presents the values of the three robust-
ness measures when using the swapping algorithm from the framework of evolvability in order to form a
hypothesis. The robustness measures based on the prediction change and corrupted instance definitions
behave very similarly against the solutions obtained by the SWAPPING ALGORITHM, just like they did for
the solutions obtained by the FIND-S algorithm.
18
Algorithm 2:Mutator function for uniform distribution
Input: dimension n, δ ∈ (0, 1), ε ∈ (0, 1), h ∈ H
Output: a new hypothesis h′
1 q ← ⌈log2(3/(2ε))⌉;
2 if |h| > 0 then Generate N− else N− ← ∅;
3 if |h| < q then Generate N+ else N+ ← ∅;
4 if |h| ≤ q then Generate N± else N± ← ∅;
5 Bene← ∅; Neutral← {h};
6 t← 2−2q ; ǫs ← 2
−2q ; δs ← δ/(6q
2n);
7 SetWeight(h, h, N−, N+,N±); νh ← Perf(h, ǫs, δs);
8 for x ∈ N+, N−, N± do
9 SetWeight(x, h, N−,N+,N±); νx ← Perf(x, ǫs, δs);
10 if νx > νh + t then Bene← Bene ∪ {x} ;
11 else if νx ≥ νh − t then Neutral← Neutral ∪ {x} ;
12 if Bene 6= ∅ then return Select(Bene) else return Select(Neutral);
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Figure 5: Experimental comparison of the different robustness measures regarding the hypotheses that are
obtained by the SWAPPING ALGORITHM. The values for all three measures almost coincide when the target
has size |c| ≥ 20 and for clarity we only plot the values until |c| = 25. Note that ER robustness is∞ when
the target size |c| is in {1, . . . , 8}∪{100} and for this reason these points are not plotted (similarly to Figure
2). Further, when 9 ≤ |c| ≤ 19, we can observe that ER robustness behaves slightly differently compared
to PC and CI and eventually in the regime 20 ≤ |c| ≤ 99 it is much closer to CI with PC being consistently
slightly larger than both of them (and this is explained by the fact that truth assignments that belong to the
disagreement region still need to be perturbed). Finally, our earlier bounds predict that the values will be
roughly the same as this time min{|h| , |c|} = |h| contrasting the observation from Figure 2.
We see that the robustness due to the error region is different for some targets of certain size compared to
the robustness values obtained when using the prediction change and the corrupted instance definitions, but
this time the differences are smaller compared to what we observe for the solutions obtained by the FIND-S
algorithm (and of course excluding the cases where the error region robustness is infinite). However this
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is more or less expected since, on one hand for the learned solution it is always true that min{|h| , |c|}
coincides with |h| which is the factor governing the robustness under the prediction change and corrupted
instance definitions, regardless of the size of the target |c|, and on the other hand, again due to the fact that
|h| = min{|h| , |c|}, the robustness of the generated solutions have significantly smaller values compared to
the robustness of the generated solutions obtained by FIND-S.
4 Inherent Bounds on Risk and Robustness for the Uniform Distribution
After showing the different behavior of various definitions of adversarial risk and robustness through a
study of monotone conjunctions under the uniform distribution, in this section, we state and prove our main
theorems about inherent barriers against achieving error region adversarial risk and robustness of arbitrary
learning problems whose instances are distributed uniformly over the n-dimension hypercube {0, 1}n.
We first define a useful notation for the size of the (partial) Hamming balls and state three lemmas and
two corollaries based on the notation.
Definition 4.1. For every n ∈ N we define the (partial) “Hamming Ball Size” function BSizen : [n] ×
[0, 1) → [0, 1) as follows
BSizen(k, λ) = 2
−n ·
(
k−1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
+ λ ·
(
n
k
))
.
Note that this function is a bijection and we use BSize−1(·) to denote its inverse. When n is clear from the
context, we will simply use BSize(·, ·) and BSize−1(·) instead.
Lemma 4.2. For µ ∈ [0, 1] we have µ ≥ BSize
(
n−
√
−2·ln(µ)·n
2 + 1, 0
)
. Also, if (k, λ) = BSize−1(µ) then
k ≥ n−
√
−2 · ln(µ) · n
2
+ 1.
Proof. Let k′ = n−
√
−2·ln(µ)·n
2 + 1. Now consider n uniform random variables X1, . . . ,Xn over {0, 1}.
We have
BSize(k′, 0) = Pr[X1 + · · ·+Xn ≤ k′ − 1].
Then, by Hoefding inequality we have
Pr[X1 + · · ·+Xn ≤ k − 1] ≤ e−n·(1−
2k−2
n
)2/2 = µ
Therefore we have,
µ ≥ BSize(k′, 0)
which proves the first part of the Lemma. Also the second part of the lemma immidiately follows because
we have
µ = BSize(k, λ) ≥ BSize(k′, 0)
which implies k ≥ k′.
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Lemma 4.3 (Followed by the Central Limit Theorem [Bil08]). For all λ ∈ [0, 1) and a ∈ R we have
lim
n→∞ |BSize(n/2 + a ·
√
n, λ)| = Φ(2a)
where Φ is the CDF of the standard normall distribution.
Lemma 4.4 ([LPV03]). If 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊n/2⌋, then BSize(k, 0) < (nk) · 22m−1−n/(2mm ) wherem = ⌊n2 ⌋.
Proof. Case of n = 2m is Lemma 3.8.2 in [LPV03]. Case of n = 2m+1 follows from the case for n = 2m
and Pascal’s equality.
Using the above lemma, we can give a worst-case and a “limit-case” bound for the Hamming ball.
Corollary 4.5. If 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊n/2⌋, then BSize(k, 0) < (nk) ·√ n22n+1 .
Proof. By Lemma A.2 we know that
(2m
m
) ≥ 22m−1√
m
. Therefore, by Lemma 4.4 we have BSize(k, 0) <(n
k
) ·√ n22n+1 .
Corollary 4.6. For any k ∈ N, limn→∞ BSize(k,0)√n·(nk)·2−n ≤
√
π
8 .
Proof. Letm = ⌊n2 ⌋. By Lemma 4.4 we have
BSize(k, 0)√
n · (nk) · 2−n ≤
22m−1√
2m
(
2m
m
)
which implies limn→∞
BSize(k,0)√
n·(nk)
≤ limm→∞ 22m−1√2m(2mm ) =
√
π
8 . Where the last equality follows from
Lemma A.3.
The following theorem, gives a general lower bound for the adversarial risk of any classification problem
for uniform distribution Un over the hypercube {0, 1}n, depending on the original error.
Theorem 4.7. Suppose P = ({0, 1}n,Y, Un, C,H,HD) is a classification problem. For any h ∈ H, c ∈ C
and r ∈ N, let µ = Risk(h, c) > 0 be the original risk and (k, λ) = BSize−1 (µ) be a function of the
original risk. Then, the error-region adversarial risk under r-perturbation is at least
Risk
ER
r (h, c) ≥ BSize(k + r, λ).
Before proving Theorem 4.7 we state and prove two corollaries. The proof of Theorem 4.7 appears in
section 4.1.
Corollary 4.8 (Error-region risk for all n). Suppose P = ({0, 1}n,Y, Un, C,H,HD) is a classification
problem. For any hypothesis h, c with risk µ ∈ (0, 12 ] in predicting a concept function c, we can increase the
risk of (h, c) from µ ∈ (0, 12 ] to µ′ ∈ [12 , 1] by changing at most
r =
√
−n · lnµ
2
+
√
−n · ln(1− µ′)
2
bits in the input instances. Namely, by using the above r, we have RiskERr (h, c) ≥ µ′. Also, to increase the
error to 12 we only need to change at most r
′ =
√
−n·ln(µ)
2 bits.
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Proof. Let (k, λ) = BSize−1(µ). By Theorem 4.7, we know that
Risk
ER
r (h, c) ≥ BSize(k + r, λ) .
By Lemma 4.2 we know that k ≥ n−
√
−2·ln(µ)·n
2 . Therefore we have
Risk
ER
r (h, c) ≥ BSize(k + r, λ)
≥ BSize
(
n+
√
−2 · ln(1− µ′) · n
2
, λ
)
≥ 1− BSize
(
n−
√
−2 · ln(1− µ′) · n
2
+ 1, 0
)
(By Lemma 4.2) ≥ µ′
Similarly, for the case of reaching error 12 we have
Risk
ER
r′ (h, c) ≥ BSize(k + r′, λ) ≥ BSize
(n
2
, λ
)
≥ 1
2
.
Example. Corollary 4.8 implies that for classification tasks over Un, by changing at most 3.04
√
n number
of bits in each example we can increase the error of an hypothesis from 1% to 99%. Furthermore, for
increasing the error just to 0.5 we need half of the number of bits, which is 1.52
√
n.
Also, the corollary bellow, gives a lower bound on the limit of adversarial risk when n 7→ ∞. This lower
bound matches the bound we have in our computational experiments.
Corollary 4.9 (Error-region risk for large n). Let and P = ({0, 1}n,Y, Un, C,H,HD) be a classification
problem nd µ ∈ (0, 1] and µ′ ∈ (µ, 1]. Then for any h ∈ H, c ∈ C such that Risk(h, c) ≥ µ we have
Riskr(h, c) ≥ µ′ for
r ≈ √n · Φ
−1(µ′)−Φ−1(µ)
2
when n 7→ ∞
where Φ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution.
Proof. For simplicity suppose µ is exactly the risk (rather than a lower bound for it). Let
(k, λ) = BSize−1 (Risk(h, c)). By Lemma 4.3, for n 7→ ∞ we have
µ = |BSize(k, λ)| ≈ Φ
(
2k − n√
n
)
.
Therefore, k ≈ n/2 + Φ−1(µ) · √n/2. By Theorem 4.7 and another application of Lemma 4.3,
Riskr(h, c) ≥ |BSize(k + r, 0)|
≈ |BSize(n/2 + Φ
−1(µ)
2
· √n− Φ
−1(µ)
2
· √n+ Φ
−1(µ′)
2
· √n, 0)|
= |BSize(n/2 + Φ
−1(µ′)
2
· √n, 0)|
≈ Φ (Φ−1(µ′))
= µ′
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Example. Corollary 4.9 implies that for classification tasks over Un, when n is large enough, we can
increase the error from 1% to 99% by changing at most 2.34
√
n bits, and we can we can increase the error
from 1% to 50% by changing at most 1.17
√
n bits in test instances.
The following theorem shows how to upper bound the adversarial robustness using the original risk.
Theorem 4.10. Suppose P = ({0, 1}n,Y, Un, C,H,HD) is a classification problem. For any h ∈ H and
c ∈ C, if µ = Risk(h, c) and (k, λ) = BSize−1(µ) depends on the original risk, then the error-region
robustness is at most
Rob
ER(h, c) ≤
n−k+1∑
r=0
(1− BSize(k + r, λ)) .
Following, using Theorem 4.10, we give an asymptotic lower bound for robustness before proving the
Theorem. The proof of Theorem 4.10 appears in section 4.1.
Corollary 4.11. Suppose P = ({0, 1}n,Y, Un, C,H,HD) is a classification problem. For any hypothesis h
with risk µ ∈ (0, 12 ], we can make h to give always wrong answers by changing r =
√−n · lnµ/2+µ·√n/2
number of bits on average. Namely, we have
Rob
ER(h, c) ≤
√
−n · lnµ
2
+ µ ·
√
n
2
.
And the following Corollary gives a lower bound on the robustness in limit.
Proof. Let (k, λ) = BSize−1(µ). By Theorem 4.10, we have
Rob
ER(h, c) ≤
n−k+1∑
r=0
1− BSize(k + r, λ) ≤
n−k+1∑
r=0
1− BSize(k + r, 0).
On the other hand, by Lemma A.4 we know that
∑n+1
i=1 BSize(i, 0) = 1 +
n
2 . Therefore we have,
Rob
ER(h, c) ≤ n− k + 1−
(
1 +
n
2
−
k−1∑
i=1
BSize(i, 0)
)
=
n
2
− k +
k−1∑
i=0
BSize(i, 0) .
Therefore we have,
Rob
ER(h, c) ≤ n
2
− k +
k−1∑
i=1
BSize(i, 0) (3)
(By Lemma 4.5) ≤ n
2
− k +
k−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
· 2−n ·
√
n
2
≤ n
2
− k + BSize(k, 0) ·
√
n
2
≤ n
2
− k + µ ·
√
n
2
.
On the other hand, by using Lemma 4.2 we know that k ≥ n−
√
−2·ln(µ)·n
2 + 1. Therefore, we have
Rob
ER(h, c) ≤
√
−n · lnµ
2
+ µ ·
√
n
2
.
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Corollary 4.12. For any µ ∈ (0, 1], classification problem P = ({0, 1}n,Y, Un, C,H,HD), and any h ∈
H, c ∈ C such that Risk(h, c) ≥ µ, we have
Rob
ER(h, c) ≤ Φ
−1(µ)
2
· √n+ µ ·
√
π · n
8
when n 7→ ∞,
where Φ is the CDF of the standard normall distribution.
Proof. Similar to inequality 3 in the proof of Corollary 4.11, for large enough n we have,
Rob
ER(h, c) ≤ n
2
− k +
k−1∑
i=1
BSize(i, 0)
(By Corollary 4.6) ≤ n
2
− k +
k−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
· 2−n ·
√
π · n
8
≤ n
2
− k + BSize(k, 0) ·
√
π · n
8
≤ n
2
− k + µ ·
√
π · n
8
Now, by Lemma 4.3, for large enough n we have k ≈ n/2 + Φ−1(µ) · √n/2. Therefore we have
Rob
ER(h, c) ≤ Φ
−1(µ)
2
· √n+ µ ·
√
π · n
8
.
Example. By changing 1.53
√
n number of bits on average we can increase the error of an hypothesis
from 1% to 100%. Also, if n 7→ ∞, by changing only 1.17√n number of bits on average we can increase
the error from 1% to 100%.
4.1 Proving Theorems 4.7 and 4.10
We start by proving Theorem 4.7. Before that we define several notations.
Definition 4.13 (Volume, expansion, internal boundary and external boundary). Let A ⊆ {0, 1}n .
• The volume of A is simply its probability vol(A) = |A|/2n.
• The r-expansion of A is Ar = {x ∈ {0, 1}n | ∃a ∈ A,HD(a, x) ≤ r}
• The external boundary of A is defined as EB(A) = A1 \ A.
• The internal boundary of A is IB(A) = {a | a ∈ A,∃x ∈ {0, 1}n \ A,HD(a, x) ≤ 1}.
The following isoperimetric inequality by Nigmatullin [Nig67] improves the famous vertex isoperimet-
ric inequality of Harper [Har66] in a way that is more suitable for us to use.
Lemma 4.14 ([Nig67, Har66]). For any set A ⊂ {0, 1}n where (k, λ) = BSize−1(vol(A)), we have
|IB(A)| ≥
(
n
k − 1
)
+ λ ·
((
n
k
)
−
(
n
k − 1
))
.
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The following simple lemma shows how to turn lower bounds for internal boundary into a lower bound
for external boundary.
Lemma 4.15 (External boundary vs. internal boundary). Suppose b : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is an internal boundary
lower bound. Namely, For any given set A ⊆ {0, 1}n we have,
vol(IB(A)) ≥ b(µ(A)) .
Then for any set A ⊆ {0, 1}n we have,
vol(EB(A)) ≥ inf{b(µ′) | µ′ − b(µ′) ≥ vol(A)} .
Proof. Suppose A ⊆ {0, 1}n is such that vol(A) ≥ µ, and let A′ = A ∪ EB(A). First we note that
IB(A′) ⊆ EB(A), because any point a′ ∈ IB(A′) cannot be also in A, as otherwise, a′ would not be an
internal boundary point in A′. Now, let µ′ = vol(A) = vol(A) + vol(EB(A)). Because b(·) is an internal
boundary lower bound, and because IB(A′) ⊆ EB(A), therefore b(µ′) ≤ vol(EB(A)). Thus, it holds that
µ′− b(µ′) ≥ µ′− vol(EB(A)) = vol(A) ≥ µ. By the definition of inf , it holds that inf{b(µ′) | µ′− b(µ′) ≥
vol(A)} ≤ b(µ′), which together with b(µ′) ≤ vol(EB(A)) implies that inf{b(µ′) | µ′−b(µ′) ≥ vol(A)} ≤
vol(EB(A)).
Now we use Lemma 4.15 to a derive a lower bound on the volume of exterior of a set.
Lemma 4.16. For any set A ⊂ {0, 1}n, if (k, λ) = BSize−1(|A|/2n), then we have
|EB(A)| ≥
(
n
k
)
+ λ ·
((
n
k + 1
)
−
(
n
k
))
.
Proof of Lemma 4.16. Using Lemma 4.14 and Lemma 4.15 we have
|EB(A)| ≥ inf
{(
n
k − 1
)
+ λ ·
((
n
k
)
−
(
n
k − 1
))
| BSize(k − 1, λ) ≥ |A|
}
.
Since BSize(·) is a monotone function,
|EB(A)| ≥
(
n
k
)
+ λ ·
((
n
k + 1
)
−
(
n
k
))
.
We now prove Theorem 4.7.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Let set E be the error region of hypothesis h with respect to concept c. Namely,
E = {x ∈ {0, 1}n | h(x) 6= c(x)}. Let (kE , λE ) = BSize−1(|E|/2n). By Lemma 4.16,
|EB(E)| ≥
(
n
kE
)
+ λE ·
((
n
kE + 1
)
−
(
n
kE
))
.
Now, by induction on r, we prove that vol(Er) ≥ BSize(kE + r, λE ). For r = 0 the statement is trivially
true. Now for r = i, we assume vol(Ei) ≥ BSize(kE + i, λE ). For r = i+ 1 we have,
vol(Ei+1) = vol(Balli+1(E))
= vol(Balli(E)) + vol(EB(Balli(E)))
(By induction) ≥ BSize(kE + i, λE ) + vol(EB(Balli(E)))
(By Lemma 4.16) ≥ BSize(kE + i, λE ) +
(
n
kE + i
)
+ λE ·
((
n
kE + i+ 1
)
−
(
n
kE + i
))
= BSize(kE + i+ 1, λE ).
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Therefore, the induction hypothesis is correct and we have vol(Er) ≥ BSize(kE + r, λE ) for all r ∈ N. Note
that vol(Er) = RiskERr (h, c), so we have
Risk
ER
r (h, c) ≥ BSize(kE + r, λE ) .
Now we state a useful lemma that connects risk to robustness.
Lemma 4.17. Suppose P = ({0, 1}n,Y, Un, C,H,HD) is a classification problem. For any h ∈ H and
c ∈ C, if (k, λ) = BSize−1 (µ) for µ = Risk(h, c) > 0, then we have,
Rob
ER(h, c) =
n−k+1∑
r=0
(
1− RiskERr (h, c)
)
.
We now use the above lemma to prove Theorem 4.10.
Proof. Let E be the error region of (h, c). Let Pra←D[HD(a, E) = r] = pr. Then, it holds that
Rob
ER(h, c) =
∑
r≥0
r · pr =
∑
r≥0
∑
i>r
pi =
∑
r≥0
(1− vol(Er)) =
∑
r≥0
(1− RiskERr (h, c)) .
Proof of Theorem 4.10. Based on Lemma 4.17,
Rob
ER(h, c) =
n−k+1∑
r=0
(1− RiskERr (h, c)).
Now Theorem 4.7 implies,
Rob
ER(h, c) ≤
n−k+1∑
r=0
1− BSize(k + r, λ).
5 Conclusions
We discussed different definitions for adversarial perturbations. We saw that definitions that do not rely on
the error region do not guarantee misclassification for the perturbed (adversarial) instance in every case.
Apart from the conceptual differences of the definitions, this was also shown through an extensive study
of attacking monotone conjunctions under the uniform distribution Un (over {0, 1}n). In this study we
were able to separate the adversarial robustness of hypotheses generated by popular algorithms, both in an
asymptotic theoretical sense as well as in the average case by observing that the results of experiments also
verify in practice the theoretical, worst-case, discrepancies on the robustness of the generated hypotheses.
Subsequently, using the error region definition as the main definition for generating adversarial instances
we were able to study and provide bounds for the adversarial risk and robustness of any classifier that is
attacked when instances are drawn from the uniform distribution Un.
There are however many interesting questions for future work. One such example is theoretical and
experimental investigation of popular algorithms in order to determine the adversarial risk and robustness of
the generated solutions in various cases. This may involve specific distributions or classes of distributions
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and of course extend the investigation to concept classes beyond that of monotone conjunctions. Such inves-
tigations appear to be important because we can gain more insight on the geometry and the properties of the
learned solutions and the extent to which such solutions are resistant to adversarial perturbations. For exam-
ple, the solutions generated by FIND-S are consistently at least as resistant to adversarial perturbations (and
for the largest part, significantly more resistant) as the solutions obtained by the SWAPPING ALGORITHM.
Another question is of course to generalize the results that we have for the error region definition under
the uniform distribution, to distributions beyond uniform. What kind of tools and techniques are required? In
the case that such bounds contain the uniform distribution as a special case, how do such bounds compare to
the bounds that we explored, given that our investigation is specific to the uniform distribution? Furthermore,
our results of Section 4 are information theoretic. Are there equivalent computationally efficient attacks by
adversaries that can achieve such bounds?
Getting along, our results, like all other current provable bounds in the literature for adversarial risk
and robustness, only apply to specific distributions that do not cover the case of image distributions. These
results, however, are first steps, and indicate similar phenomena (e.g., relation to isoperimetric inequalities).
Thus, though challenging, these works motivate a deeper study of such inequalities for specific distributions.
In addition, the work of Fawzi et al. [FFF18] has a discussion on how attacks on “nice” distributions can
potentially imply attacks on real data. That would be the case assuming the existence of a generative model
that transforms “nicely”-distributed random latent vectors into natural data. Therefore, eventually an inter-
esting line of work would be to investigate scenarios that also apply to the case of image classification and
other very popular every-day classification tasks, highlighting further the importance of the investigations
suggested in the previous paragraph.
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A Some Useful Facts
Lemma A.1. Let n ∈ N∗. Then,
⌊n/2⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
=
n∑
i=⌈n/2⌉
(
n
i
)
≥ 2n−1 .
Proof. If n is even, then n/2 is an integer and moreover ⌊n/2⌋ = n/2 = ⌈n/2⌉. Therefore the sequence(
n
⌈n/2⌉
)
,
(
n
⌈n/2⌉+1
)
, . . . ,
(
n
n
)
has 1+n/2 terms. The expansion
(
n
0
)
,
(
n
1
)
, . . . ,
(
n
n
)
has n+1 terms and moreover(
n
j
)
=
(
n
n−j
)
for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n/2− 1}. Let A =∑n/2−1j=0 (nj) =∑nk=n/2+1 (nk). Then, A+ ( nn/2)+A =
2n ⇒ A = 2n−1 − ( nn/2)/2. But this implies that∑ni=⌈n/2⌉ (ni) = ( nn/2)+A = 2n−1 + ( nn/2)/2 > 2n−1.
If n is odd, then the sequence
(
n
⌈n/2⌉
)
,
(
n
⌈n/2⌉+1
)
, . . . ,
(
n
n
)
has 1 + n− ⌈n/2⌉ = 1+ ⌊n/2⌋ = (1 + n)/2
terms. Further, again by symmetry we have B =
∑⌊n/2⌋
j=0
(
n
j
)
=
∑n
k=⌈n/2⌉
(
n
k
)
. Then, B +B = 2n ⇒ B =
2n−1.
Lemma A.2. For anym ∈ N we have (2mm ) ≥ 22m−1√m .
Lemma A.3. We have limm→∞ 2
2m
(2mm )·
√
m
=
√
π.
Lemma A.4. Let k ∈ N. Then,∑ki=0 i · (ki) = k · 2k−1.
Lemma A.5. Let 1 ≤ u ≤ w. Let 1 ≤ ζ ≤ u and 1 ≤ ξ ≤ w. Then,
u
8
· 2u+w ≤
u∑
ζ=1
(
u
ζ
) w∑
ξ=ζ
(
w
ξ
)
min{ζ, ξ}
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Proof. We have,
u∑
ζ=1
(
u
ζ
) w∑
ξ=ζ
(
w
ξ
)
min{ζ, ξ} ≥
⌈u/2⌉∑
ζ=1
ζ
(
u
ζ
) w∑
ξ=⌈w/2⌉
(
w
ξ
)
≥ 2w−1
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(
u− 1
ζ − 1
)
(Lemma A.1 )
=
u
2
· 2w ·
⌈u/2⌉−1∑
ζ=0
(
u− 1
ζ
)
=
u
2
· 2w ·
⌊(u−1)/2⌋∑
ζ=0
(
u− 1
ζ
)
We now use Lemma A.1 again and obtain the statement.
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